Late Budgets

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Late Budgets. / Andersen, Asger Lau; Lassen, David Dreyer; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2010.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Andersen, AL, Lassen, DD & Nielsen, LHW 2010 'Late Budgets' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Andersen, A. L., Lassen, D. D., & Nielsen, L. H. W. (2010). Late Budgets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Andersen AL, Lassen DD, Nielsen LHW. Late Budgets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 2010.

Author

Andersen, Asger Lau ; Lassen, David Dreyer ; Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh. / Late Budgets. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2010.

Bibtex

@techreport{211fad1052b011df928f000ea68e967b,
title = "Late Budgets",
abstract = "The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budgetnegotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, politisk {\o}konomi, government budgeting, state government, presidential democracies, political economy, fiscal stalemate, war of attrition",
author = "Andersen, {Asger Lau} and Lassen, {David Dreyer} and Nielsen, {Lasse Holb{\o}ll Westh}",
note = "JEL classification: D72, H11, H72, H83",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Late Budgets

AU - Andersen, Asger Lau

AU - Lassen, David Dreyer

AU - Nielsen, Lasse Holbøll Westh

N1 - JEL classification: D72, H11, H72, H83

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budgetnegotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.

AB - The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budgetnegotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - politisk økonomi

KW - government budgeting

KW - state government

KW - presidential democracies

KW - political economy

KW - fiscal stalemate

KW - war of attrition

M3 - Working paper

BT - Late Budgets

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 19436201